The Bush administration has been criticized for departures from the rule of law, but within the administration law was not ignored. Instead it was seen variously as a tool and as a potential threat to the operation of the executive branch. Two narratives compete for attention. In an era when the legality of torture was openly debated, the deployment of law in wartime seemed the most immediate issue. At the same time, however, a decades-long conservative movement to change American law was both significantly furthered and complicated, as Supreme Court appointments moved the Court to the right, but the lack of a common jurisprudence hampered the consolidation of a new conservative constitutional vision. More conservative courts might seem a safe haven for the president, less likely to challenge executive branch actions, but the Bush administration had a complicated relationship with courts. The administration sought out the courts to further aspects of a social policy agenda, such as restricting abortion rights and gun control. But when it came to challenges to the executive branch itself, the Administration used creative means to avoid court jurisdiction, including constitutional theories about executive power. Law was both a sword and a shield: it was a tool used to further some conservative objectives, and it was a shield intended to protect executive autonomy.
Addington and Vice President Cheney in particular "viewed every encounter outside the innermost core of most trusted advisors as a zero-sum game that if they didn't win they would necessarily losei' accordittg to Goldsmith. In this context, arguments about law were volleys in an international struggle for power; they were "strategic lawfarei' The fusion of war and law-lawfare, or warlaw-is usually thought of as law on the battlefield, the way the laws of war might characterize as lawful a soldier shooti.g one person (an enemy soldier) but not another (a civilian). But after September rr, the fusion of war and law seeped into the basic domestic administration of justice. Legal LL, 2oot , to the present, is already among the longest wars in American historyl' One of the reason s habeas corpus was needed was that "the consequence of error may be detention of persons for the duration of hostilities that may last a generation or mo rel' The lack of tirne boundaries made this conflict different from past wars, I(ennedy reasoned, requiring more judicial oversight.ro And so the troublesome nature of twenty-first-century war, with no end in sight, would lead the Court to limit the Bush administration's power, but, as before, this ruling had its limits.
Months after the ruling, detainees were still waiting for their habeas challenges to be resolved, even though the Court had stressed that "the costs of delay can no longer be borne by those who are held in custodyl' On November 2c., zoo8, Federal District fudge Richard I. Leon granted habeas relief to five detainees, finding their detention unlawful. Th"y had been held at Guant6namo for seven years. fudge Leon urged the administration not to appeal the case because the evidence was so weak, and to release these detainees "forthwithl' Finally, on Decembe r t6, zoo8, three of the men were repatriated to Bosnia 
